Really sharp analysis on this. The distinction betweeninstitutional embeddedness versus stand-alone military power is crucial here and often missed. I've seen similar dynamics in eastern european securitized regimes where the question isn't capability but incentive structure. The councilization framwork you describe sounds alot like what happened in post-Soviet transition states when no single successor could consolidate. Gradual transformation beats dramatic rupture almost every time in systems this complex.
Very interesting analysis. But in my observation of authoritarian regimes, there's always a pragmatic group, even if of low rank. The question is whether they're willing to take a risk.
"As such, the post-Khamenei trajectory is likely to encompass a range of outcomes rather than a single rupture."
I think this is what people/observers normally miss. There's this idea that there will be a single eruption that brings down the regime. Even the 79 Revolution was a series of events that led to the Shah fleeing, protests had been ongoing since the land reforms and other changes in the mid 60s.
It would likely be a long term transition after which a structure emerges that comes from within the preexisting structure.
I think the argument partly misses the context in which many of us are using the word “coup.” The issue is not whether the IRGC would carry out a classic, overt military takeover, but what kind of intervention becomes more plausible under conditions of acute instability rather than managed transition.
Gradual, negotiated transformation presupposes a minimum level of institutional stability and time. The current moment is the opposite: succession uncertainty, war-induced shocks, elite attrition, and mass repression have compressed decision-making horizons. In such contexts, an abrupt managerial shock to the system can be more attractive to the IRGC than prolonged bargaining.
When we speak of the IRGC in this scenario, we are not referring to its most ideological or radical elements, but to its more pragmatic, system-aligned, hegemonic factions—those primarily concerned with preserving control, coherence, and state capacity. From that angle, a short-term disruptive move can appear less risky than a slow erosion of authority.
In that sense, the text treats “coup” and “transformation” as mutually exclusive categories, while the present context suggests they may overlap. The problem is not the institutional analysis per se, but reading it outside the temporal and crisis context in which the term coup is being invoked
Mr. Azizi has here described the internal power dynamics of the Islamic Republic of Iran with both precision and accuracy as concerns the IRGC’s position in this evolving system.
Really sharp analysis on this. The distinction betweeninstitutional embeddedness versus stand-alone military power is crucial here and often missed. I've seen similar dynamics in eastern european securitized regimes where the question isn't capability but incentive structure. The councilization framwork you describe sounds alot like what happened in post-Soviet transition states when no single successor could consolidate. Gradual transformation beats dramatic rupture almost every time in systems this complex.
Very interesting analysis. But in my observation of authoritarian regimes, there's always a pragmatic group, even if of low rank. The question is whether they're willing to take a risk.
"As such, the post-Khamenei trajectory is likely to encompass a range of outcomes rather than a single rupture."
I think this is what people/observers normally miss. There's this idea that there will be a single eruption that brings down the regime. Even the 79 Revolution was a series of events that led to the Shah fleeing, protests had been ongoing since the land reforms and other changes in the mid 60s.
It would likely be a long term transition after which a structure emerges that comes from within the preexisting structure.
I think the argument partly misses the context in which many of us are using the word “coup.” The issue is not whether the IRGC would carry out a classic, overt military takeover, but what kind of intervention becomes more plausible under conditions of acute instability rather than managed transition.
Gradual, negotiated transformation presupposes a minimum level of institutional stability and time. The current moment is the opposite: succession uncertainty, war-induced shocks, elite attrition, and mass repression have compressed decision-making horizons. In such contexts, an abrupt managerial shock to the system can be more attractive to the IRGC than prolonged bargaining.
When we speak of the IRGC in this scenario, we are not referring to its most ideological or radical elements, but to its more pragmatic, system-aligned, hegemonic factions—those primarily concerned with preserving control, coherence, and state capacity. From that angle, a short-term disruptive move can appear less risky than a slow erosion of authority.
In that sense, the text treats “coup” and “transformation” as mutually exclusive categories, while the present context suggests they may overlap. The problem is not the institutional analysis per se, but reading it outside the temporal and crisis context in which the term coup is being invoked
Mr. Azizi has here described the internal power dynamics of the Islamic Republic of Iran with both precision and accuracy as concerns the IRGC’s position in this evolving system.