Kheili mamnoon Hamidreza, for this swift first survey.
Two thoughts associated with the fundamental strategic dilemma you identify:
1)
There is a familiar American aversion to acknowledging that the United States is subject to strategic dilemmas. I.e. "decapitation" of the Islamic Republic assumes that the country's body politic will sprout a new head, in which a new national identity is conceived, that will govern in ways America likes. But previous American interventions have been more likely to result in the "reverse Medusa effect:" decapitation is followed by the sprouting of many new aspirant heads, disunified in aspiration and unequal in efficacy, which do not together stabilise the attacked country domestically, or provide America with a replacement that is either uniformly amenable or a uniform adversary.
Whereas American interventionism proceeds with the confidence that strategic dilemmas are things only other countries suffer, it's difficult to see the prospect of a successful decapitation of the Islamic Republic resulting in anything other than the usual multiplication of problems - at domestic, regional and larger scales, as you have intimated.
2)
Also as usual, a likely effect is aiding Turkey's strategic potency - neither polarized between Iran and NATO, nor obliged to get involved.
Considering what's going on next to Turkey in Syria, the regional disorder prospectively catalysed by America's attack on Iran may reinforce Turkey's perennial status as a mercurial bridge power.
In this sense - again as past instances - America's confidence in not being subject to strategic dilemmas (and therefore striking at will) is a confidence that such strikes in fact tend to donate to other regional powers - which need neither to participate in the intervention n the short term, nor take sides with the attacked adversary in the long term.
Thank you for your clarity, detail, and synthesis of military immediacy with strategic perennials, and for stimulating thought on this matter.
I do not think this becomes a prolonged war. still looks like crisis bargaining at a larger scale. although regardless, it’s the people of Iran who pay the price
the pattern of: strike fast and hard at the start of the weekend when markets are closed to avoid large selloffs, then work towards a deal before the bleeding gets too bad, rhymes with Trump's previous foreign interventions.
Iran gets to claim a symbolic victory by surviving without regime change (Khamenei is old af but the theocratic regime still has legs). US imperialism is reinforced through access to their oil, a nuclear freeze, normalized relations on Western terms. maybe Iran uses a prolonged war as justification for their legitimacy like they did with Iraq, but that feels beyond their capacity
Trump's "regime change" framing is his typical maximalist opening bid, he does not actually care. A prolonged war dragging Gulf allies into the fire, with Iran threatening the Strait of Hormuz and oil spiking, would be a political disaster this close to midterms, that's what he cares about. the last thing Trump needs is $150 oil and US bases taking casualties in Kuwait and Bahrain. a deal is still what's best for him.
as for "this is about freedom for Iran", he's really going to say that after letting thousands of protesters get massacred over the past month? It's political theater, and my heart goes out to the people of Iran. they pay the price whether this ends in war or in a deal that leaves their oppressors intact and reinforces American imperialism.
Yes Iran can absorb initial or long aggression. The aggressor’s own troops are powerless on the ground. The reordering is Saudi and Turkiye consolidation and Iran resilient.
Kheili mamnoon Hamidreza, for this swift first survey.
Two thoughts associated with the fundamental strategic dilemma you identify:
1)
There is a familiar American aversion to acknowledging that the United States is subject to strategic dilemmas. I.e. "decapitation" of the Islamic Republic assumes that the country's body politic will sprout a new head, in which a new national identity is conceived, that will govern in ways America likes. But previous American interventions have been more likely to result in the "reverse Medusa effect:" decapitation is followed by the sprouting of many new aspirant heads, disunified in aspiration and unequal in efficacy, which do not together stabilise the attacked country domestically, or provide America with a replacement that is either uniformly amenable or a uniform adversary.
Whereas American interventionism proceeds with the confidence that strategic dilemmas are things only other countries suffer, it's difficult to see the prospect of a successful decapitation of the Islamic Republic resulting in anything other than the usual multiplication of problems - at domestic, regional and larger scales, as you have intimated.
2)
Also as usual, a likely effect is aiding Turkey's strategic potency - neither polarized between Iran and NATO, nor obliged to get involved.
Considering what's going on next to Turkey in Syria, the regional disorder prospectively catalysed by America's attack on Iran may reinforce Turkey's perennial status as a mercurial bridge power.
In this sense - again as past instances - America's confidence in not being subject to strategic dilemmas (and therefore striking at will) is a confidence that such strikes in fact tend to donate to other regional powers - which need neither to participate in the intervention n the short term, nor take sides with the attacked adversary in the long term.
Thank you for your clarity, detail, and synthesis of military immediacy with strategic perennials, and for stimulating thought on this matter.
Regards from Australia,
Benedict Moleta
Many thanks for taking the time to provide such a detailed feedback. I truly appreciate it. And all valid points, indeed!
Khahesh mikonam Hamidreza,
Thank you for your valuable work.
I do not think this becomes a prolonged war. still looks like crisis bargaining at a larger scale. although regardless, it’s the people of Iran who pay the price
the pattern of: strike fast and hard at the start of the weekend when markets are closed to avoid large selloffs, then work towards a deal before the bleeding gets too bad, rhymes with Trump's previous foreign interventions.
Iran gets to claim a symbolic victory by surviving without regime change (Khamenei is old af but the theocratic regime still has legs). US imperialism is reinforced through access to their oil, a nuclear freeze, normalized relations on Western terms. maybe Iran uses a prolonged war as justification for their legitimacy like they did with Iraq, but that feels beyond their capacity
Trump's "regime change" framing is his typical maximalist opening bid, he does not actually care. A prolonged war dragging Gulf allies into the fire, with Iran threatening the Strait of Hormuz and oil spiking, would be a political disaster this close to midterms, that's what he cares about. the last thing Trump needs is $150 oil and US bases taking casualties in Kuwait and Bahrain. a deal is still what's best for him.
as for "this is about freedom for Iran", he's really going to say that after letting thousands of protesters get massacred over the past month? It's political theater, and my heart goes out to the people of Iran. they pay the price whether this ends in war or in a deal that leaves their oppressors intact and reinforces American imperialism.
Very cogent analysis, and persuasive. Thanks
Thank you for your kind feedback!
Excellent analysis, Hamidreza, thank you.
As I wrote yesterday in my article, the unknown remains Iran's (underestimated or overestimated?) capacity to absorb and withstand the shock.
Thanks for your kind feedback!
Yes Iran can absorb initial or long aggression. The aggressor’s own troops are powerless on the ground. The reordering is Saudi and Turkiye consolidation and Iran resilient.